The fair use doctrine in the US provides great flexibility, but that flexibility in many instances comes at the cost of certainty and predictability. We are not suggesting that reasonable judgments cannot be made about whether a particular use is fair; certainly experienced practitioners make such judgments daily. But fair use decisions are often complicated, and advice frequently depends as much on the amount of risk the user is willing to undertake as it does on the evaluation of the substantive law. Our point is not that fair use caselaw absolutely resists synthesis, but rather that the synthesis most successfully occurs at a high level of abstraction; individual actors, by contrast, need to know whether their particular plans will run afoul of the law.
Legal literature has seen many attempts over the years to simplify or clarify fair use, both descriptive and prescriptive. But it would be premature to conclude that the law of fair use is or soon will be coherent and predictable. Guidelines could theoretically help in interpreting fair use, but the weight and value of guidelines depends on how they were developed.
The ALRC Discussion Paper's proposals could result in a broader fair use doctrine in Australia than in the US. Notably, fair use in Australia, as in the US, would exempt certain uses without countervailing compensation. But the proposed Australian version may embrace a greater range of commercial actors, thus altering the balance. The proposals include additional illustrative purposes; they would also permit commercial users to stand in the shoes of clients entitled to exceptions. The ALRC also proposes that contracts or contract provisions that attempt to bargain around library exceptions and certain fair use exceptions would be unenforceable. In the US, contracts concerning copyrighted materials are usually upheld. As a general rule, contract preemption does not serve to invalidate contract provisions that limit the exercise of copyright exceptions, and the doctrine of copyright misuse does so only in the most egregious of cases.
Finally, in the US there is no exemption from anti-circumvention of technological access controls for such broad purposes as "exercising fair use" or "making noninfringing use." Certain narrow fair uses have been deemed exceptions pursuant to a triennial rulemaking conducted by the Copyright Office, but those exceptions must be revisited every three years.
Introduction and Background
The Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts is part of Columbia Law School in New York. The Kernochan Center's program for Intellectual Property Studies and Law Reform seeks through research, study and publication to help resolve problems that new technologies pose for authors and users.
These comments respond to Copyright and the Digital Economy, Discussion Paper 79 (June 2013), of the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC). That discussion paper is part of the ALRC's ongoing effort to determine whether the existing exceptions in Australian copyright law are sufficient to promote creativity and innovation in the digital economy, and whether they should be changed.
We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the ALRC's very thoughtful Discussion Paper, which covers a wide range of issues and clearly represents an enormous undertaking. Our earlier report, Copyright Exceptions in the United States for Educational Uses of Copyrighted Works, 2 submitted in response to the ALRC's Copyright and the Digital Economy Issues Paper, addressed US copyright exceptions applicable to educational uses of copyrighted works, including fair use. These comments further expand, and in some cases refine, our earlier report. To avoid unnecessary duplication, we assume familiarity with that report. These comments focus primarily on the fair use exception in US copyright law, and related issues.
In broad brush, ALRC Discussion Paper 79 recommends  Adopting a new fair use exception, with statutory factors similar to those of the US but with additional illustrative purposes, including education; non-consumptive use; private and domestic use; and public administration.
 Repealing existing fair dealing and other specific exceptions.
2 Available at http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/copyright-and-digital-economy/submissions-receivedalrc, Comment 291 [hereinafter, Kernochan Center Report.]  Alternatively, if a broad fair use exception is not enacted, the ALRC recommends incorporating the fairness factors into the fair dealing exceptions, and adding more fair dealing exceptions (for the purposes listed above).
 Repealing the statutory licenses for educational and other institutions in VA and VB.
 Providing that license agreements should be deemed invalid to the extent that their terms exclude or limit the operation of certain fair use or fair dealing exceptions and library exceptions.
The ALRC Discussion Paper also suggests that an exemption from anti-circumvention provisions for certain types of fair use and library use "may be justified," 3 though it acknowledges that anti-circumvention is outside of its purview.
We begin in section 2.0 by discussing the uncertainty inherent in fair use as it has been applied in the United States. In section 3.0 we expand our discussion of fair use guidelines. Section 4.0 explains some ways in which the fair use regime proposed for Australia could be broader than that of the United States, including the possibility that commercial entities would be permitted to "stand in the shoes" of users they service, and the interplay between contracts and the fair use exception. In section 5.0 we discuss fair use and the protection for technological means of protecting copyrighted works as provided in section 1201 of Title 17. Finally, we conclude in section 6.0.
The Uncertainty Inherent in Fair Use
The ALRC Discussion Paper suggests that the law concerning fair use is consistent and predictable. 4 As far as US law is concerned, this is a rather optimistic assessment. Many in the United States -including users, legal practitioners and courts -do not regard the law of fair use as consistent and predictable, although they wish it were. The US benefits from the flexibility of the fair use exception, but that flexibility comes at a cost. Courts have described the issue of fair use as "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright," 5 a sentiment shared by 3 ALRC Discussion Paper at 377. 4 Id. at 79. Although that formulation [Take not from others to such an extent and in such a manner that you would be resentful if they so took from you] scarcely resolves concrete cases, it provides the beginning of wisdom by acknowledging that rigid application of set formulae may itself prove inexact. In the end, reliance on the four statutory factors to reach fair use decisions often seems naught but a fairy tale.
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We are not suggesting that reasonable judgments cannot be made about whether a use is fair; not only have some academics posited an overall coherence to the case law, but experienced practitioners give fair use advice on a daily basis. But fair use decisions are often complicated, and advice frequently depends as much on the amount of risk the user is willing to undertake as it does on the evaluation of the substantive law. Legal opinions are usually accompanied by various explanations and disclaimers concerning the uncertainty of fair use. Our point is not that fair use caselaw absolutely resists synthesis (after all, the current section 107 is itself a synthesis of the prior hundred years of caselaw), but rather that the synthesis most successfully occurs at a high level of abstraction; individual actors, by contrast, need to know whether their particular plans will run afoul of the law. It is important, we believe, to distinguish the academic's exercise of analyzing every fair use decision from the counselor's assessment of what kinds and quantities of copying not only will support a successful fair use defense, but -far more importantly to the user -will avoid attracting a lawsuit in the first place.
Providing ex ante advice or rules remains difficult even for many sophisticated attorneys. For example,
From the ex post perspective of the defendant already embroiled in expensive litigation, an adaptable, equitable defense is useful. But for the prospective defendant wondering whether a given act will prove infringing, fair use is too ambiguous to provide much ex ante guidance.
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*** Fair use in copyright law is one of the more challenging and unpredictable legal tests around. Even those of us who frequently deal with it find it difficult to provide hard-and-fast guidance. As I wrote a few years ago, it's simply not possible to honestly give simple, clear, advance fair use guidelines for the multitude of situations that come up. careers in copyright and spend a lot of time making fair use analysis, we don't always agree; there are a lot of close calls. It's hard. Fair use is really hard.
The unpaid nature of fair use introduces pressures that may distort analysis, particularly of the "transformative" character of the use, and of potential market harm. Faced with a use, particularly in the context of new technologies, that a court perceives to be socially beneficial, a court may overemphasize its "transformativeness" and correspondingly underestimate the market consequences, in order to prevent the copyright owner from frustrating the social benefit. Distortions can appear in the other direction as well: a court sensitive to the economic consequences of the unpaid use may feel obliged to downplay the public interest fostered by the use. Statutory licenses can alleviate these pressures by ensuring that uses which the legislator perceives to be in the public interest proceed free of the copyright owner's veto, but with compensation. The paucity of such statutory licenses in the US may account to some extent for the long-standing disarray of fair use caselaw. We suggest that it is premature to conclude that commentators have clarified fair use and that, going forward, the law will be consistent and predictable.
Fair Use Guidelines
It is precisely because fair use is neither clear nor predictable that people seek the greater certainty that guidelines can provide. In our earlier report, we described various guidelines developed before or shortly after the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act to assist users and right holders in applying the fair use doctrine in the educational context, and, in particular, the guidelines that were included in congressional reports.
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Our aim was not to provide a substantive evaluation of those guidelines, but to describe what they were and how they came about. We agree with those who criticize certain courts for turning them into a ceiling rather than a floor. 23 The guidelines themselves indicate that was not the intention.
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Although Congress arguably gave its imprimatur to these guidelines by including them in the legislative history, 25 it is not our understanding that any of those guidelines were agreed to by all relevant interested parties. However, it appears that these guidelines did involve negotiations between participants with competing interests. We find frankly perplexing the argument made in one of the comments on the ALRC Discussion Paper, repudiating the Classroom Photocopy Guidelines on the ground that user groups had insufficient role in their development, yet embracing the more recent, unilaterally-developed "Best Practices" as superior because right holders had no role in their development. 26 We believe that guidelines can be useful, provided they are developed with input from right holders and users, are reasonably clear and not unduly rigid. The degree to which guidelines can be followed with confidence, and the legal weight they are accorded, depends in 28 The comment by Hinze et al., supra note 26 at 10, characterizes the Best Practices as a sincere attempt to describe circumstances in which the unauthorized use of copyrighted material is "crucial to the fulfillment of that community's shared artistic or informational mission." We appreciate the Best Practices' endeavor to articulate user communities' perceived needs, but a user group's shared perception that uncompensated copying and communication of works of authorship is critical to its mission does not suffice to make the desired use "fair," particularly if the interests of the user group align almost exclusively in favor of limiting the scope of copyright. In that respect, user-generated guidelines expressing the needs of a community, such as documentary filmmakers, whose members are both copyright owners and users should enjoy greater credibility than the assertions of the needs of less balanced constituencies. Certain aspects of the ALRC's Discussion Paper and recommendations suggest that, if those recommendations were adopted, fair use in Australia could be broader than it is in the United States. For example, the additional illustrative purposes would likely contribute to the breadth of fair use in Australia, especially such potentially elastic purposes as "private and domestic use." Other aspects of the ALRC's proposal that could contribute to a broader fair use regime in Australia include: (i) the suggestion that commercial entities be permitted to "stand in the shoes" of the user; (ii) the proposal that certain fair use and library exceptions "trump" contracts; and (iii) the suggestion that certain fair use and library exceptions be an acceptable basis for circumventing technological protections on copyrighted works. The first two topics are addressed in this section; technological protection is addressed separately in section 5.0.
"Standing in the Shoes"
While the ALRC Discussion Paper does not recommend that third parties automatically be entitled to rely on the fair use exceptions of their customers, it does suggest various scenarios in which such reliance should be permissible.
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US law is not entirely consistent, but in numerous instances US courts have declined to permit third party for-profit businesses to claim the same privileges and defenses as their customers. publishers sued a copy shop that was producing course packs for students at a local university. Professors would provide master copies of the class materials to the copy shop, which would reproduce the materials and sell them to students registered for the professors' classes. While the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the students might have been protected under the fair use doctrine had they individually copied the material for use in class, it found this of little consequence:
We need not decide this question, however, for the fact is that the copying complained of here was performed on a profit-making basis by a commercial enterprise. 38 The court observed that TV News
Clips' copying was "unabashedly commercial" despite the use to which the customers put their copy. The court explained:
Of course, every commercial exchange of goods and services involves both the giving of the good or service and the taking of the purchase price. The fact that TV News Clips focuses on the giving rather than the taking cannot hide the fact that profit is its primary motive for making the exchange. 
Invalidating Contracts
The ALRC has proposed to amend the Australian Copyright Act to render unenforceable contracts or contractual terms excluding or limiting the operation of libraries and archives exceptions, and the proposed fair use exception (in relation to fair uses for the purpose of research or study; criticism or review; parody or satire; reporting news; and quotation). 46 The report compares this provision with US law, stating that "US law has developed copyright specific constraints on the freedom of parties to contract out of copyright exceptions, based on the doctrines of copyright preemption and copyright misuse." 47 However, under US law neither contract preemption nor copyright misuse are generally perceived (or used) as tools to invalidate contract provisions solely because they prohibit the exercise of copyright exceptions. Copyright misuse can result in invalidating a contract or contract provisions, but only in egregious cases where the contract does not merely preclude the licensee from taking advantage of a copyright exception, but does so in a manner that contravenes the fundamental public policies underlying the copyright law. 44 Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218, 223-224 (2005) , codified in 17 U.S.C. § 110 (11).
45 Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-43. The statutory exception for the in-home use and sale of the video-editing technology, enacted during the pendency of the Clean Flicks suit, depends on not making a retention copy of the edited version, and thus Clean Flicks' activities were not covered. The court concluded that Clean Flicks' activities were not fair use, even though Clean Flicks had contended that there was no market harm because Clean Flicks required its customers also to buy an unedited version of the motion picture that Clean Flicks had edited.
46 ALRC Discussion Paper at 353.
47 ALRC Discussion Paper at 361. The Discussion Paper significantly qualifies this statement in subsequent discussion. Id. at 361-62.
Preemption
US copyright law preempts all legal or equitable rights under state law that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright. 48 A state law-based right is not deemed the "equivalent" of copyright rights if the state law cause of action "contains an operative element that is absent from the cause of action for copyright infringement." 49 Contract law "is a good example of a state law that will be immune from preemption under the extra element test"; the bargainedfor exchange or the promise to pay can be viewed as the extra element that precludes preemption. 50 As the ALRC Discussion Paper observes, US law places few restrictions on parties to contract around copyright exceptions as they wish. In fact, in the US, parties are generally free to contract out of copyright exceptions or limitations, and do so every day. Such contracts do not trigger copyright preemption.
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For example, distinguished individuals -or their estates -may be reluctant to deposit private letters and papers in a library or archives without contractual assurances as to how those materials will be used. Indeed, one of the chief reasons for the provision in section 108 of US law, which specifically preserves the parties' right to contract, was to ensure that libraries could enter into enforceable agreements with donors of manuscripts and private papers who want assurances that their materials will not be reproduced.
Similarly, a publisher may limit who has access to a copyrighted work, by the number of simultaneous users, by restrictions on the nature of users (e.g., to faculty, staff, students and walk-ins) on the permissible venues for use, etc. These restrictions may reflect the manner in which the publisher has priced its product, concerns about the ease of infringement, differing copyright laws in other jurisdictions, and so on. Such provisions are generally valid.
Copyright Misuse
The "copyright misuse defense" does not invalidate contract provisions simply because they prohibit the exercise of copyright privileges with respect to the licensed material. The copyright misuse doctrine has been limited to only the most egregious of conduct with respect to copyrighted works.
The copyright misuse doctrine was founded on the doctrine of patent misuse, established by the Supreme Court in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. in 1942. 53 In Lasercomb America v.
Reynolds, 54 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held for the first time that copyright misuse is a valid defense to a copyright infringement action, regardless of whether the party asserting misuse can prove an antitrust violation. 55 The contract at issue in that case, a license for software developed by Lasercomb, prohibited licensees from creating any computer program that performed the same functions as Lasercomb's (even if they made no use of Lasercomb's) for ninety-nine years, which the court observed could be longer than the term of the copyright. 56 The court concluded that Lasercomb's contract contravened the public policies underlying the copyright system by prohibiting its licensees' employees from using their "creative abilities."
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Whether a court will sustain a copyright misuse defense depends upon whether a copyright owner is using its copyright in a manner contrary to the public policies underlying copyright law. 58 Once an affirmative defense of copyright misuse has been proven, the copyright owner is prevented from enforcing its copyright and bringing suits for infringement until it demonstrates that it has purged itself of misuse.
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After Lasercomb, a violation of antitrust law may be sufficient but is not necessary for copyright misuse. Since that case was decided, the majority (but not all) of U.S. circuit courts have recognized the copyright misuse defense. The only standard that courts apply to such agreements is that they are "egregious" or obviously overreaching. 60 Since Lasercomb many alleged infringers have asserted this defense, and most have failed. 61 The courts uphold this defense very sparingly; only a handful of cases have found copyright misuse. Two of these are circuit court cases dealing with licensing agreement provisions that involved "tying" the copyright license to unprotected subject matter, or which were otherwise egregiously anticompetitive. 62 The third was a straightforward district court case where the copyright owner attempted to assert a copyright over material in which it held no rights. 
5.0
Technological Protection Section 1201 of Title 17, enacted as part of the DMCA, prohibits the act of circumventing a technological protection measure (TPM) that "effectively controls access" to a work protected by copyright.
Section 1201 provides a number of exemptions that excuse conduct that would otherwise violate the prohibition on circumventing access controls. 65 The Librarian of Congress has the authority to create additional exemptions based on the record established in a triennial rulemaking proceeding conducted by the U.S. Copyright Office. 66 Those additional exemptions last only three years; each rulemaking proceeding considers the exemptions de novo.
There is no blanket exemption in section 1201 that allows a user to circumvent access controls to make a fair use of the underlying work. Courts on several occasions have declined to read one into the statute. 67 For example, in Universal City Studios v. Corley, 68 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected defendant's argument that fair use of DVD movies is "constitutionally required," holding that the DMCA does not impose any limitation on the opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair uses of DVD movies. According to the court, produced to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work, or (2) that have only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent such controls, or (3) that are marketed for use in circumventing such controls. Second, the DMCA prohibits trafficking in devices or services to circumvent technological rights controls (mechanisms that restrict copying the work or playing it in a particular environment without authorization). There is no prohibition on the act of circumventing rights controls. 65 These exemptions include those for: nonprofit libraries, archives and educational institutions to allow them to determine whether or not they would like to acquire a work, §1201(d); law enforcement, intelligence, and other government activities, §1201(e); reverse engineering of computer programs for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing elements of the program necessary to achieve interoperability with other programs, §1201(f); encryption research, §1201(g); protection of minors by preventing their access to materials on the internet, §1201(h); circumvention with the sole effect of identifying and disabling the capability of a TPM to collect personally identifying information, §1201(i); and security testing, §1201(j). "Fair use has never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user's preferred technique or in the format of the original." 69 In the triennial rulemakings, the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress have consistently refused to grant exemptions for broad categories like "fair use works" or "educational fair use works," for "all noninfringing uses" or for "any work to which a user had initial lawful access." 70 Initially the Register interpreted the statute as requiring that an exemption be based on a class of works, and therefore described solely with reference to the works subject to the exemption rather than on the users or the types of uses. 71 This approach eventually became unworkable: the Office was in the position of denying certain narrow exemptions it deemed warranted, rather than creating an exemption solely with reference to the class of works, which would be far broader than necessary to accommodate those specific uses. 72 Accordingly, in 2006 the Register concluded that while the class of works eligible for circumvention must be identified initially by type of work, that class may be refined and limited based on the particular use.
The unwillingness to create exemptions for such broad categories reflects recognition that TPMs are both access-limiting and access-enabling. Congress knew that in some cases TPMs might make the exercise of copyright exemptions more difficult, but it nevertheless decided that effective technological protections would encourage innovation in new content delivery mechanisms and provide consumers with a range of new options for experiencing copyrighted works. 74 Broad exemptions could ultimately diminish rather than increase consumer access to protected works. The Copyright Office has concluded that narrow exemptions can be sought in future rulemaking proceedings for those "exceptional cases" where access for permitted uses is truly impeded.
Conclusion
We appreciate this opportunity to submit comments to the ALRC. We have endeavored in this submission to show that the US experience indicates that while fair provides flexibility, it also brings with it considerable uncertainty. It would be premature to conclude that going forward, fair use law in the US will be coherent and predictable.
As we have discussed above, aspects of the ALRC's discussion and recommendations suggest that if adopted, fair use in Australia could be broader than in the United States.
We reiterate our earlier caution that any analysis of the similarities and differences between US law and a proposed fair use exception in Australia is necessarily tentative, because US fair use law continues to develop and certain cases addressing fair use in the educational context are still in their early stages. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 947-50 (9th Cir. 2010) (Congress intended to grant copyright owners an independent right to enforce the prohibition against circumvention of effective technological access controls regardless of whether there was a specific nexus to copyright infringement, to encourage copyright owners to make their works available in digital formats such as on-demand or pay-per-view which allow customers effectively to "borrow" a copy of work for a limited time or a limited number of uses.), amended and superseded on denial of rehearing, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011 .
